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Decriminalizing Non-Appearance in
Washington State:
The Problem and Solutions for Washington’s Bail
Jumping Statute and Court Nonappearance
Aleksandrea E. Johnson*
Seattle University School of Law
“The missed court appearance is used to coerce guilty pleas from
individuals who otherwise wish to contest the underlying charges.”1

I.

INTRODUCTION
Gary Baxter missed one of his many court dates. Upon realizing that he

missed this pretrial hearing, Mr. Baxter immediately called his assigned
public defender. Like many individuals in this situation, Mr. Baxter and his
public defender quickly addressed his failure to appear (FTA) by quashing
the FTA warrant and scheduling a new court date. Unfortunately, this was
not the first time Mr. Baxter failed to appear at one of his court dates. He
missed court once before, due to struggles with his mental illness. Despite
his efforts to rectify this mistake, the State gave Mr. Baxter a choice—plead
guilty to the charge of felony harassment or go to trial with two additional
charges of felony bail jumping—charges the prosecutor could easily prove.
Mr. Baxter decided to exercise his constitutional rights and proceeded to
trial. The jury found Mr. Baxter not guilty of harassment, but his relief was
*

J.D. Candidate 2020, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Hillary Behrman, Jason Schwarz, Magda Baker, Jaime Hawk, and the Washington
Defender Association team for their support and feedback in connection with this article
and the overall efforts to reform the charge of bail jumping. The author would also like to
thank the many public defenders and criminal defense attorneys across the state who
illuminated this issue and uplifted their client’s stories.
1
WDA Bail Jump Survey 7 (Oct 19, 2018) (unpublished informal survey) (on file with
the Washington Defender Association and author).
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immediately shattered when the jury found him guilty of two counts of bail
jumping. The judge then sentenced Mr. Baxter to five years in prison for
failure to appear to his court hearings. Mr. Baxter’s incarceration resulted
from the effects of his mental illness, coupled with an unfair prosecutorial
tactic used to secure convictions. Had he not struggled with mental illness,
Mr. Baxter would be free today.

2

Criminal prosecution and punishment for failure to appear is a salient
feature of the United States criminal legal system. Most people in the
United States know that failing to attend criminal court proceedings will
result in an arrest warrant and the possibility of bail revocation. Historically,
the criminalization of nonappearance first appeared as a subset of contempt
3

of authority. The 1960s invigorated a bail reform movement, finding that
there were two systems of justice: one for the rich who could afford to pay
4

bail and one for the poor. The bail reform movement gained steam with the
founding of the Manhattan Bail Project, which conducted a study that found
that defendants released on their own recognizance had a lower
nonappearance rate than defendants being held under the traditional money
5

bail system. By 1966, these studies lead to major revisions to the Federal
Bail Reform Act of 1954 that favored personal recognizance release over
the previous bail– forfeiture structure.6

2

See The Real World Impact of Criminalizing Failure to Appear 1-2 (Oct. 30, 2018)
(unpublished policy materials) (on file with the Washington Defender Association and
author). Author has removed all names and identifying information to ensure privacy .
Story based on reported case to the Washington Defender Association. Used with
permission from the Washington Defender Association.
3
Daniel Bernal, Taking the Court to the People: Real World Solutions for NonAppearance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 553 (2017); Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime:
Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L. J. 1435, 1455 (2009).
4
Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventative Detention: A Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices
in the United States, England, Canada, and Other Common Law Nations, 8 PACE INT’L
L. REV. 399, 407 (1996).
5
Id.
6
Id. at 407-408.
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Despite these victories, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 also
outlined penalties for failure to appear in federal prosecutions, though
previously criminal punishment for missing court, or “jumping bail,” was
7

rare and primarily occurred in contempt processes. The revisions to the
Bail Reform Act outlined penalties for failure to appear in federal
8

prosecutions. Under those revisions, those convicted of felonies would face
a maximum five-year sentence and up to a $5,000 fine, and those convicted
of misdemeanors would face year in jail and a fine equivalent to the
9

underlying charge for failing to appear to court. Before the 1966 revisions,
only seven states punished defendants for nonappearance.

10

By the 1984

Federal Bail Act, thirty-three states enacted similar provisions.

11

Now,

12

almost every state criminalizes nonappearance.
Washington State is included in this history. The Washington State
legislature first conceptualized the idea of bail jumping in the 1970s when it
revised its criminal code.13 Washington State passed the first rendition of the
bail jumping statute in 1975, then amended it in 1983, and again in 2001.14
Criminally prosecuting people who “jump bail” is widely accepted, but
ineffective in accomplishing its goal of deterring court nonappearance. In fact,
data shows that while failure to appear convictions have risen, failure to appear
rates have remained consistent.15 The underlying assumption for

7

Murphy, supra note 3, at 1455-56.
Id.
9 Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 1457; Ethan Corey & Puck Lo, The ‘Failure to Appear’ Fallacy, THE APPEAL
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://theappeal.org/the-failure-to-appear-fallacy/?fbclid=IwAR0Qarj
Dh8F8XgoWSB-I5IZC2SSPVeMB8eOEHpjK33LKuH858Z6dNJGYMPU
[https://perma.cc/2VUW-SYU9].
13
LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REV. WASH. CRIM. CODE, 329-331(1970).
14
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1975), amended by WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170
(1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1983), amended by WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.76.170 (2001).
15
Murphy, supra note 3, at 1458.
8
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criminalizing the act of nonappearance is that the threat of a criminal
penalty will encourage defendants to come to court.

16

Bail jumping,

however, is not the only penalty utilized when a defendant misses court.
Upon failing to appear to a court proceeding, the judge can issue a FTA
bench warrant which can lead to the defendant’s arrest.17 The defendant’s
failure to appear can lead to many consequences, including jeopardizing a
defendant’s ability for release on bail in the present case and in future cases,
imposing fees such as warrant fees, and placing holds or suspending the
defendant’s license.18 Missing from this conversation is why people miss
court. People miss court for many reasons, such as lack of transportation,
conflicting childcare duties, and the difficult choice between maintaining
employment or going to court.

19

Missing court is often unintentional and

not a representation of the defendant’s view on the court’s authority.20
While the United States is reconciling its practice of cash bail and its impact
on mass incarceration, it must also examine bail jumping statutes that allow
further prosecution and criminalization of low-income people and people of
color. It is unduly punitive to criminally punish nonappearance with an
additional criminal charge when a person’s bail conditions are already affected
by the failure to appear. The bail jumping charge is not an effective way to deter
nonappearance; rather, it unfairly pressures defendants to enter plea bargains.21
It has been a tool utilized to secure convictions rather than justice. 22 The
Washington State legislature must decriminalize nonappearance by eliminating
Washington’s bail jumping statute.
16
17
18

LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 331.
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(l)(1), WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(c).
WASH. REV. CODE 46.20.289 (2012); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(c); 12 ROYCE A.
FERGUSON, JR.,WASH. PRAC. & PROC. § 408 (3d ed. 2019).
19
Alan Tomkins, Brian H. Bornstein, Mitchel Norman Herian, David I. Rosenbaum, &
Elizabeth Neeley, An Experiment in the Law: Studying a Technique to Reduce Failure to
Appear in Court, 48 J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N. 96, 97 (2012)
20
Id.
21
See infra Section IV.
22
Id.

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Decriminalizing Non-Appearance

Defendants already face punitive action for court nonappearance as FTA
warrants impact a judge’s decisions on bail imposition and revocation in the
individual’s present and future cases. 23 There are many changes that could
reduce the unfair impact the bail jumping charge has on defendants, such as
increasing the mental state requirements (mens rea) from knowingly to
intentionally, reducing the charge to a misdemeanor, and allowing more
defenses for defendants to fight the charge. However, eliminating the statute
in its entirety best ensures the fair administration of justice, particularly for
those most affected by the barriers to court appearance.
In addition to repealing the bail jumping statute, Washington courts should
reconsider the practice of mandatory court appearances, outside the necessary
stages of arraignment and trial. Judges and defense attorneys can help alleviate
the burden of many court appearances on those who often lack the resources to
attend court, by inquiring more thoroughly about the defendant’s ability to
attend court hearings and creating a more robust waiver of appearance practice.
In addition, Washington should further invest in technology and community–
based resources that are shown to be more effective in improving court
appearance rates.24 Integrating postcard and text–reminder and communication
systems to remind defendants of their court dates, improving client–attorney
communications, and creating more expansive options to reschedule court dates
will help improve the efficiency of court dates and increase trust and confidence
in the court system.25 By utilizing technology shown to dramatically improve
court appearance rates, nonappearance based criminal punishment would no
longer be necessary. Further investing in community resources, such as
Outreach Courts and

23

See infra Section V.C.1.
See Jason Tashea, Text–Message Reminders are a Cheap and Effective Way to Reduce
Pretrial Detention (July 17, 2018, 7:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/
article/text_messages_can_keep_people_out_of_jail [https://perma.cc/R7WP-VG8Z].
25
BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, ALAN J. TOMKINS, & ELIZABETH M. NEELEY, REDUCING
COURTS’ FAILURE TO APPEAR RATE: A PROCEDURAL JUSTICE APPROACH 28 (2011).
24
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daycare facilities will help dismantle the barriers to court appearance
without relying on punishment.

II.

26

ROADMAP

Section III of this article will first define and distinguish the legal terms
of art “bail jumping” and “failure to appear.” This portion of the article will
describe how the two terms of art apply to the criminalization of
nonappearance. Section IV of this article will examine who is affected by
the criminalization of nonappearance and the varying reasons as to why
nonappearance occurs. This examination frames the article’s solution—the
call to abolish the Washington State bail jumping statute and to encourage
court appearance in different, more effective ways. Additionally, this
portion of the article will highlight how particular demographics play a role
in nonappearance issues.
Section V of this article will discuss the history of the Washington State bail
jumping statute and describe how it is applied today. The article will further
discuss what happens when a person misses court, how the statute works in
practice, and the case law surrounding it. This portion of the article will
highlight the implications of the bail jumping charge, including cost
implications, the use of bail jumping in plea negotiations, the enhanced
sentencing implications of a bail jumping conviction, and the collateral
consequences of a bail jumping conviction or its use in coercing a guilty plea.
After describing how the bail jumping statute works, Section VI will
propose solutions to the problems described. This article will argue for
abolishing Washington’s criminalization of nonappearance, propose a more
robust judicial and defense practice of waivers of appearances to court
appearances where the defendant’s presence is not actually necessary, and
explore how innovative reminder systems and other community–based
programs dismantle the barriers to appearing in court. Section VII of this
26

See infra Section 0.0 and notes 267 & 272.
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article will address the criticism’s proposals, including arguments for public
safety, deterrence, and already-existing rules in place against prosecutorial
vindictiveness.
On March 18, 2020, Governor Jay Inslee signed Engrossed Substitute House
Bill 2231 which significantly reforms the bail jumping statute. Section IX of
this article will discuss the changes to the bail jumping statute. This article will
conclude discussing further reforms to the new bail jumping statute and
changes to decriminalize nonappearance in Washington State.

III.

DISTINGUISHING BAIL JUMPING AND FAILURE TO APPEAR

The terms “bail jumping” and “failure to appear” are often used
interchangeably, but are distinguishable legal terms of art. The term “bail
jumping” refers to the criminal charge of failing to appear to court and
generally includes that:
[T]he defendant is released from custody or allowed to remain at
liberty by court order, either upon bail or upon the defendant’s own
recognizance, upon the condition that the defendant will subsequently
appear personally at a designated date, time and place, which the
defendant fails to do, either personally or voluntarily, within a specified
27

period of time after such time.
The term “failure to appear” refers to the defendant’s nonappearance,
regardless of whether that person fled the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution
or incarceration or missed court because of sickness, work conflict, lack of
transportation, or other more common reasons. 28
Failing to appear to court does not always result in the criminal charge of bail
jumping for a variety of reasons. Bail jumping or failure to appear statutes vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and often limit bail jumping charges to specific
underlying crimes. For example, the bail jumping statute might authorize the
charge in felony and misdemeanor cases, but not in traffic
27
28

8 C.J.S. Bail §136 (2018).
Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 677, 720 (2018).
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cases.

29

In addition, whether a person is charged often depends on the

prosecutor’s discretion, policies, and practices. For example, the King
County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office states in its charging manual that
“[b]ail jumping should not be ordinarily filed when the defendant turned
themselves in within six weeks of missing court AND did not commit any
new offenses while on FTA status.”30
This article is about the consequences specific to the criminal charge “bail
jumping” and criminal penalties related to nonappearance. The efficacy of FTA
warrants, bail revocation, and pretrial condition consequences for failure to
appear are outside the scope of this article. However, it will reference the issues
of failure to appear consequences because of its overlap and the breadth of
research on the issue of court nonappearance. There is limited research on
failure to appear, and even less data on the charge of bail jumping because of
the diversity between statutes and practices from state to state. Because of the
overlapping issues and populations involved in court nonappearance, failure to
appear research is an important part to understanding the implications of bail
jumping charges and helps support solutions to prevent nonappearance, and thus
the bail jump charge.31

IV.

WHO MISSES COURT AND WHY

The approach on bail jumping and failure to appear for the last thirty
years assumed that nonappearance or “jumping bail” rested purely on the
defendant’s choice.32 But people miss court for a variety of reasons having
29

See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (2001); LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
supra note 13, at 330-31.
30
KING COUNTY PROSECUTING ATT’Y’S OFF. FILING AND DISPOSITION STANDARDS
(2016) https://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/prosecutor/documents/2016/fads-may-

2016.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/3NQ5-BT8F].
31
See Brian H. Bornstein, Alan J. Tomkins, Elizabeth M. Neeley, Mitchel N Herian, &
Joseph A. Hamm, Reducing Courts’ Failure–to–appear Rate by Written Reminders, 19
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 70, 70 (2013).
32
Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Economics of Bail Jumping, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 381, 382
(1981).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Decriminalizing Non-Appearance

nothing to do with deliberately disobeying the court. Understanding the
make-up of who fails to appear to court and why they fail to appear to court
helps innovate solutions for encouraging appearance through means other
than criminalization.
It is difficult to determine FTA rates due to varying definitions and
measures among researchers.33 The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ report on
Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts found that state court
felony defendants had a failure to appear rate between twenty-one percent
and twenty-four percent from 1990 to 2004.34 Prior research has shown that
the national failure to appear rate has hovered around three percent and has
stayed stable over time, despite rising conviction rates for failure to
appear.

35

State failure to appear rates may be higher than the national

failure to appear rate, at times rates up to twenty-four percent.36 With a rate
of pretrial nonappearance up to twenty-four percent, bail jumping has the
ability to impact a large number of cases.
Some defendants willfully fail to appear to court, but many fail to appear
not only because they fear the consequences of the legal proceedings but
also because they are unable to obtain reliable transportation, have other
competing responsibilities (such as work, care for child or another person),
or are disorganized, including forgetting appointments or losing critical
information (e.g., citation, contact, or location).37 Factors associated with
33

Bernal, supra note 3 at 554.
Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ
214994, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, 8 (2007)
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB3R-SLK9].
35
Murphy, supra note 3, at 1459.
36
Id. at 1460–61 (“One multi–city study sets the range as from 21 to 24% of released
defendants. Another study of Lake County, Illinois reported that roughly 16% of released
defendants under supervision failed to report for a court date, although that number
fluctuated wildly – from as low as 5% in 1987 to a peak of 23% in 1995 and then back
down to 14% in 2000.”).
37
Tomkins et al., supra note 19, at 97; see also David I. Rosenbaum, Nicole Hutsell,
Alan J. Tomkins, Brian H. Bornstein, Mitchel N. Herian, and Elizabeth M. Neely, Court
Date Reminder Postcards, 95 JUDICATURE 177, 178 (2012).
34
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failure to appear include gender, race, offense type, prior criminal history, living
conditions, and employment.38 A study on assessing race and gender-specific
predictors of failure to appear found that “indigence had a positive significant
impact on [failure to appear] (i.e., indigent defendants were more likely to
FTA)” affecting all racial and gender groups’ likelihood of failure to appear.39
One reason for the high correlation of nonappearance and indigency could be a
lack of access to reliable transportation, though general lack of economic
resources may account for the behavior of nonappearance. 40 In addition, those
arrested for drug offenses had higher failure to appear rates. 41 Those struggling
with mental health disorders or addiction could have a higher failure to appear
rate because their addiction may impair their decision-making or physical
ability to attend their scheduled court hearings.42
Research also suggests that people of color tend to have higher failure to
appear rates.43 The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that young male Black
and Hispanic defendants are more likely to be charged with failure to appear
related criminal charges.44 The report found that 25% of Black and Hispanic
defendants were charged with failure to appear compared to 19% of White
defendants.45 This correlation could be related to structural barriers
38

Haley R. Zettler & Robert G. Morris, An Exploratory Assessment of Race and
Gender– Specific Predictors of Failure to Appear in Court Among Defendants Released
via a Pretrial Services Agency, 40 CRIM. JUST. REV. 417, 418-419 (2015).
39
Id. at 426.
40
Id.; see also Elisabeth Winston Lambert, A Way Out of the “Rotten Social
Background” Stalemate: “Scarcity” and Stephen Morse’s Proposed Generic Partial
Excuse, 21 UNIV. OF PA. J. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 298, 318-323 (2018) (explaining
Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir’s theory of scarcity and how poverty impacts
people’s behavior and cognition).
41
Brian Johnson, Christopher Kierkus & Christine Yalda, Who Skips? An Analysis of
Bail Bond Failure to Appear, 9 J. APPLIED SEC. RES. 1, 12 (2014).
42
Id.
43
Zettler & Morris, supra note 38, at 419 (In summarizing the current literature, this
article states that previous studies have found that Black and Hispanic defendants were
more likely to FTA than their White counterparts and that females may be more likely to
FTA than males in particular jurisdictions).
44
COHEN & REAVES, supra note 34, at 8-9.
45
Id.
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associated with indigency and lack of trust and confidence in court
46

institutions.

Trust and confidence, procedural justice perceptions, and

levels of cynicism are significantly correlated with court appearances. 47
This study found that “Whites had more dispositional trust than non-whites,
and Blacks had less trust in the courts than Whites and Hispanics.”48 The
various ways that the criminal legal system produces racial and class
disparities and the lack of trust in the institution may explain the increased
failure to appear charges against people of color.49
Stating that people miss court due to choice alone is hardly a convincing
argument when many people targeted and affected by the criminal legal
system are experiencing the symptoms of poverty, mental illness, addiction,
50

or institutional racism.

It is likely that statutes criminalizing failure to

appear most affect those who fail to appear struggling with poverty,
addiction, and institutional racism as all of these groups are highly
represented in the criminal legal system.

46
47
48

See BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 25, at 28.
Id.
Id.
49
See id.; See also Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, Preliminary
Report on Race in Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623,
636-37 (2012) (“there is substantial evidence to support the notion that racial inequities
do permeate the criminal justice system” in Washington State, including in prosecutorial
charging and sentencing recommendations).
50

See Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, supra note 49, at 636-37 (“…
there is substantial evidence to support the notion that racial inequities do permeate the
criminal justice system” in Washington state, including in prosecutorial charging and
sentencing recommendations.); See also Report of the Sentencing Project to the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia,
and Related Intolerance: Regarding Disparities in the United States Criminal

Justice System, SENTENCING PROJECT (Mar. 2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/
[https://perma.cc/5R8D-6JM8].
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V.

BAIL JUMPING IN WASHINGTON STATE

To understand the consequences of the bail jumping statute in
Washington State, it is necessary to first understand the statute’s legislative
history, its policy purposes, and its day-today implementations.
A.

The History of the Bail Jumping Statute in Washington State
Washington criminalizes a defendant’s nonappearance to court through RCW

9A.76.170.51 The idea of criminalizing failure to appear in Washington State
began in 1970 with two purposes: “(1) to give added legal incentives to
defendants not to fail to appear for their trials, and (2) to construct a criminal
law framework for wider use of releases on personal recognizance.”52
Originally, the charge required that the failure to appear be intentional and

51

WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (2001).
LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 330-31. The proposed
framework of the bail jumping statute provided a bail jumping in the first degree and in
the second degree as follows:
9A.76.140. Bail Jumping in the First Degree
(1) A person is guilty of bail jumping in the first degree if, having been released from
custody by court order with or without bail, upon condition that he will subsequently
appear at a specified time and place in connection with a charge of having committed any
felony, he intentionally fails without lawful excuse to appear at such time and place.
(2) Bail jumping in the first degree is a third–degree felony.
9A.76.150. Bail Jumping in the Second Degree
(1) A person is guilty of bail jumping in the second degree if having been released or
excused from custody with our without bail by court order, summons, or citation, upon
condition that he will subsequently appear at a specified time and place in connection
with a charge of having committed any misdemeanor, or gross misdemeanor, he
intentionally fails without lawful excuse to appear at such time and place.
(2) This section 9A.76.150 does not apply to a person released from custody that he will
appear in connection with a charge of having committed a misdemeanor in violation of
Title 46 of the Revised Code of Washington or in violation of any other traffic code:
PROVIDED, that this subsection (2) does not apply to charges of negligent driving as
defined by RCW 46.61.525.
(3) Bail jumping in the second degree is:
(a) A gross misdemeanor, if the defense is in connection with which the defendant fails
to appear is a gross misdemeanor;
(b) A misdemeanor, if the offense is in connection with which the defendant fails to
appear is a misdemeanor.
52
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that the failure to appear be “without lawful excuse” as a catch-all.53 Those
developing the bail jumping framework believed that the bail jumping
would provide greater incentives for defendants to appear for their trials
than the current bail forfeiture system and saw it as an “adequate substitute
for the money-bail system in instances where the court would prefer to use
personal recognizance as a basis for release.”54
In 1975, the Washington State legislature adopted bail jumping into its
criminal code.55 The legislature adopted a different framework than the original
proposal, though presumably with the same general purposes. The 1975 version
of the bail jumping statute required that a defendant knowingly fail to appear
without lawful excuse, unlike the intentional mental state in the proposed
framework.56 This version shifted the burden of proof of “lawful excuse” on the
defense.57 In contrast to its proposed framework, this rendition of bail jumping
created a classification structure of bail jumping.58
53
54
55

Id.
Id. at 331.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1975), amended by WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.76.170(1983):
(1) Any person having been released by court order or admitted to bail with the
requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state, and who
knowingly fails without lawful excuse to appear as required is guilty of bail jumping.
Unless otherwise established, the failure to appear when required shall be inferred to have
been without lawful excuse.
(2) Bail jumping is:
(a) A Class A felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of murder in
the first degree;
(b) A Class B felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a class A
felony;
(c) A Class C felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a Class B
felony;
(d) A gross misdemeanor if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a
Class C felony;
(e) A misdemeanor if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a gross
misdemeanor or misdemeanor.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020

445

446 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

In 1983, however, the Washington Supreme Court found the 1975 version of
the statute deficient because the legislature did not provide a definition of
lawful excuse, thus holding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.59 This
decision prompted the state legislature to amend the statute. Rather than
defining lawful excuse, the legislature omitted the lawful excuse framework
entirely, leaving the mental state of knowingly intact. 60 In 2001, the statute
effective today, added failure to report to serve a sentence as a qualifying
situation for bail jump and added the affirmative defense of uncontrollable
circumstances.61 The 2001 amendment to bail jumping was passed with
amendments to criminal statutes related to “escaping from custody,” perhaps
indicating that its purpose is to target those who abscond from the
administration of justice.62 Washington courts interpret that the statute’s
purpose is “to compel appearances at criminal hearings” and “not intended to
add or diminish the punishment associated with the underlying offense.”63 The
meaning and intent of the bail jumping statute has evolved over time from its
original intent to substitute a cash bail system and to target only those who
intentionally fail to appear to a knowingly mental state and one affirmative
defense of uncontrollable circumstances.64

B.

Policy Implications

As a policy, bail jumping is a process crime. 65 Process crimes are
offenses that interfere with the procedures and administration of justice and
66

are generally secondary to an underlying crime. Process offenses combine
notions of malum in se, or acts that are inherently immoral, and malum
59

State v. Hilt, 662 P.2d 52, 53 (Wash. 1983).
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1983), amended by WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170
(2001).
61
13A SETH A. FINE, WASH. PRAC. § 1806 (3d ed. 2019).
62
Wash. S. B. Rep, H.B. 1227, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Session (2001).
63
State v. Coucil, 210 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
64
LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 329-31.
65
Murphy, supra note 3, at 1454-55.
66
Id. at 1439-40.
60
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prohibitum, or an act that is a crime only because it is against the law. 67
Thus, process crimes, such as bail jumping, aim to uphold society’s
“collective interest in the integrity of the system of governance.”68 Though
upholding the integrity of the administration of justice is a legitimate goal,
the application of pretextual prosecution to punish offenders of process
69

crimes distorts this legitimate goal.
Pretextual prosecution refers to prosecutorial tactics that target defendants
based on one crime but prosecute the defendant for another crime and are a
direct result of prosecutorial charging discretion.70 There are a number of
reasons why pretextual prosecutions are attached to process offenses, such as
bail jumping. First, process offenses carry legitimacy, meaning that the public
generally agrees that the process crime conduct should be outlawed.71 Second,
process offenses usually carry significant sanctions, most commonly high
sentencing ranges and stigma.72 Third, the government helps produce the
evidence to prove the crime, such as the court record or the court clerk’s
minutes.73 Fourth, the process crime is a secondary charge to an underlying
crime.74 Finally and importantly, process crimes are easy to prove and very
difficult to defend.75 One identified motivation for pretextual prosecutions is to
secure convictions “against simply defiant or insubordinate individuals — not
because their actions actually threaten the integrity of judicial processes, or
because they are otherwise difficult to convict, but solely because their acts
constitute an affront to the formal dignity or authority of the State.”76

67

Id. at 1441; Malum in se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Malum
prohibitum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
68
Murphy, supra note 3, at 1441.
69
Id. at 1441-42.
70
Id. at 1442.
71
Id. at 1443-44.
72
Id. at 1444.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1445.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1446.
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Bail jumping, not only in Washington State but across the country, fits
under all of the process crimes goals. Society wants defendants to appear in
court. Bail jumping often carries significant sentencing ramifications for the
defendant.77 Most often, the prosecution’s evidence to prove bail jumping is
merely the court record, court clerk, or court documents.78 The State can
only charge bail jumping against a defendant if they are “held for, charged
with, or convicted” of a crime and is secondary to an underlying offense.79
Based on the elements and evidence available, it is very easy for the
prosecution to prove that a defendant knowingly failed to appear to court.
Additionally, the affirmative defense of uncontrollable circumstances is
difficult to prove and, often, unsuccessful in gaining acquittals. 80
Bail jumping prosecution is wholly inconsistent with the reasons that
people actually miss court and produce coercive and unjust results. As
noted in Section IV of this article, many individuals miss court because of
issues related to poverty, such as lack of transportation or child care, mental
illness, or drug addiction.81 Further punitive measures for failure to appear
increases distrust in the courts and does not proactively resolve why people
miss court.82
C.

How Bail Jumping Works
It is important to understand how failure to appear and the bail jumping

statute procedurally works in order to understand the implications of a bail
jumping charge and conviction. This section will discuss what happens when an
individual misses court, the elements of the bail jumping charge, the

77

See infra Sections 0.0.0, 0.0.0.
See State v. Hart, 381 P.3d 142, 147 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Boyd, 308 P.3d
362, 370–71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
79
WASH. REV. CODE. § 9A.76.170(3) (2001).
80
See infra Section 0.0.0.
81
See supra Section IV.
82
Bornstein et al., supra note 31, at 76.
78
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affirmative defenses available to those charged, and the sentencing
consequences upon conviction.
1.

What Happens When a Defendant Misses Court

Understanding the procedure when a defendant misses a court date is
pivotal in understanding the issues surrounding the bail jumping statute. A
defendant’s presence is required at the arraignment, at every stage of the
trial, at the imposition of sentence, and any other hearing the court deems
necessary.83 At the preliminary appearance, the court will order the
defendant’s release on personal recognizance, unless the court determines
that release will not reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance or if it is
shown that there is a likely danger that the defendant will pose a risk to
commit a subsequent violent crime or intimidate witnesses.84 If there is a
showing that there is a likely risk of failure to appear upon release, the court
may place the defendant on pretrial supervision and set bail. 85 The court
will consider a number of circumstances when determining conditions of
release that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance.86

83

WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM . R. 3.4. It is important to note that a defendant also has the
constitutional right, through the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to be present at trial and at any stage of a criminal
proceeding that is critical to the outcome if the defendant’s presence would contribute to the
fairness of the procedure. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); see also Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). The author does not advocate that a court can proceed in the
defendant’s absence at a critical hearing or trial in violation of these constitutional rights,
rather, that the numerous pretrial case setting hearings may be onerous on defendants,
particularly those with limited means and resources.
84
85

WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(a).
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(b).
86
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(c); 12 WASH. PRAC., Criminal Practice & Procedure
§ 408 (3d ed. 2019), (The court considers circumstances including but not limited to:
length and character of residence in the community, employment status, history, and
financial conditions, family ties and relationships, reputation, character, and me ntal
condition, history with the legal process, including prior instances of nonappearance, and
prior criminal record, the nature of the charge, and past record of threatening victims or
witnesses or interference with the administration of justice.).
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Upon missing a court proceeding where the defendant’s personal
appearance is necessary, the court may order the defendant to appear by
87

issuing a bench warrant, otherwise known as an FTA warrant. Once the
defendant is apprehended, surrenders to law enforcement authorities, or
appears on a quash docket, the court will hold a hearing to review the
conditions of release and may revoke the defendant’s release and order
88

forfeiture of the bond. If the failure to appear is proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the court may revoke the defendant’s release.89
Alternatively, the court may decide to impose or maintain bail or amend the
defendant’s conditions of release.

90

Additionally, the court may punish a

person for willful disobedience to the lawful process of mandate of a court
91

through contempt procedures. Penalties for bail jumping do not dilute the
court’s power to exercise contempt sanctions. 92
2.

The Elements
In addition to any court-imposed penalties for failure to appear, the State may

prosecute the defendant for bail jumping.93 In order to convict a person of bail
jumping, “The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
‘(1) was held for, charged with, or convicted of a particular crime;

(2) was released by court order or admitted to bail with the requirement of
subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as
required.’”94
First, the statute requires that a defendant be held for, charged with, or
convicted of a particular underlying crime.95 The Court of Appeals held that
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2 (l)(1), WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4.
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2 (k), WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(j)(2).
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(k)(2).
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2 (j)(2).
12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASH. PRAC. § 411 (3d ed. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Hart, 381 P.3d at 146 (citing State v. Williams, 170 P.3d 30, 33 (Wash. 2007)).
95
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3) (2001).
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a person can be charged with bail jumping “while being simply held for a
crime (i.e., prior to arraignment), while charged with a crime (i.e., following
arraignment, but prior to trial), or while convicted of a crime (i.e., following
96

trial).” Because of this holding, even if the underlying crime results in a
dismissal or acquittal, the defendant can still be charged, prosecuted, and
97

convicted of a bail jumping charge. Further, the classification of the bail
jumping charge, in other words the level or class of felony or misdemeanor,
is determined when the failure to appear occurs.98 Even if the underlying
crime is reduced from a felony charge to a misdemeanor charge, the bail
99

jumping classification stays the same.
In State v. Williams, the
Washington Supreme Court held that the classification of the bail jumping
charge is not an element of the crime and thus does not need to be included
in the to-convict jury instruction.100
Second, the defendant must have been released either by court order,
otherwise referred to as personal recognizance, or by posting bail with a
requirement of subsequent personal appearance. 101 Third, the person must
knowingly fail to appear.102 In order to prove that the defendant had
knowledge of the court date, the State must prove that the defendant had
been given notice of the court date. 103

96

Coucil, 210 P.3d at 1060.

97

WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3) (2001); State v. Downing, 93 P.3d 900, 903–04 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that this issue is sufficiently analogous to charges of escape, thus
rejecting the argument that invalidity of the underlying conviction is a defense to the crime of
bail jumping); see also Williams, 170 P.3d at 34, State v. Gonzalez–Lopez,

132 P.3d 1128, 1136 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming bail jumping conviction where
the defendant was acquitted of the underlying offense).
98
Coucil, 210 P.3d at 1060.
99
Id. (“Under the statute’s plain language, the seriousness of an incident of bail jumping
is determined by the status of the underlying offense at the time that the offender jumps
bail.”).
100

Williams, 170 P.3d at 35.
Hart, 381 P.3d at 146.
102 Id.
103
State v. Carver, 93 P.3d 947, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
101
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The prosecution can prove the elements of bail jumping with a few pieces
of evidence to show that the defendant knew of the requirement to appear
for a court date. The prosecution can show this through a court transcript or
through a signed setting slip by the defendant.

104

The prosecution can also

call the court clerk to testify to the defendant’s nonappearance, admit a
clerk’s minute regarding the defendant’s absence, and the issuance of a
bench warrant.105
3.

Affirmative Defenses

The bail jumping statute explicitly mentions the defense “uncontrollable
circumstances.”106 The “uncontrollable circumstances” defense is defined as
“an act of nature, such as a flood, earthquake, or fire, or a medical condition
that requires immediate hospitalization or treatment, or an act of a human
being such as an automobile accident or threats of death, forcible sexual
attack, or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future for which there is
no time for a complaint to the authorities and no time or opportunity to
resort to the courts.”107 The Washington pattern jury instructions describe
the defense as follows:
(1) Uncontrollable circumstances prevented the defendant from
[personally appearing in court] [or] [failing to surrender for
service of sentence]; and
(2) The defendant did not contribute to the creation of such
circumstance in reckless disregard of the requirement to
[appear] [or][surrender]; and
(3) The defendant [appeared] [or] [surrendered] as soon as such
circumstances ceased to exist.108

104

Boyd, 308 P.3d at 371.
Hart, 381 P.3d at 145.
106
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(2) (2001).
107
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.101(4) (2013).
108
11 WASH. PRAC., PATTERN JURY INST. CRIM. WPIC 19.17 (4th ed. 2016) (bracketed phrases in
original).
105
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The defendant must prove this defense by a preponderance of the
evidence.109 The “uncontrollable circumstances” defense supplements the
common law defense of necessity, but is much narrower than the general
necessity defense.110 In general, necessity “is available as a defense when
the physical forces of nature or the pressure of circumstances cause the
defendant to take unlawful action to avoid harm which social policy deems
greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law.”111 While courts
have not decided whether incarceration is an uncontrollable
circumstance,

112

it is possible courts will consider failure to appear due to

incarceration as a defendant’s contribution to a creation of a circumstance in
reckless disregard for the requirement to appear or surrender.

113

As such, an “uncontrollable circumstances” defense is difficult to employ
against an easily proved charge and does not acknowledge the many reasons
why people miss court. For example, courts have rejected this defense when
the defendant cannot show proof of hospitalization. 114 Uncontrollable
circumstances only contemplates serious events that obstruct a person’s
ability to appear in court rather than the usual reasons such as sickness, lack
of transportation, or childcare.
Other defenses have been unsuccessful in the courts. For example, in
State v. Carver, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s claim that he
forgot about his court appearance was not a defense and the prosecutor did
not commit prosecutorial misconduct by telling the jury during closing
arguments that forgetfulness was not a defense. 115 In addition, because
principles of the necessity defense underlie the “uncontrollable
109

Id.

110

Id.; see also State v. White, 152 P.3d 354, 366 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); W ASH. REV. CODE §
9A.76.101(4) (2013).
111
State v. Diana, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
112
See State v. O’Brien, 267 P.3d 422, 426 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
113
See Wash. S. B. Rep, H.B. 1227, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Session (2001); See also 11 WASH. PRAC.,
PATTERN JURY INST. CRIM. WPIC 19.17 (4th ed. 2016).
114
State v. Fredrick, 97 P.3d 47, 49 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
115
Carver, 93 P.3d at 950.
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circumstances” defense, a defendant is not entitled to the general necessity
defense jury instructions.

116

This conclusion is problematic because the

courts have been unwilling to accept other defenses that acknowledge the
many reasons why people miss court. Thus, the jury is unable to seriously
consider evidence or arguments that address the reason the person missed
court.
4.

Sentencing Consequences
Bail jumping, like other process crimes, has serious sentencing

implications.

117

Washington utilizes a determinant sentencing grid for most

118

felony crimes.
in Table 1.

The relevant portion of the sentencing grid is represented

Table 1. Bail Jump Classifications with the Relevant Adult Felony
Sentencing Grid.119
Bail Jump
Classification

SERIOUS

OFFENSE SCORE

LEVEL

0

1

120

Class A

VI

Class B121

V

13m
12+–14
9m
6–12

18m
15–20
13m
12+–14

2

3

2y
2y 6m
21–27 26–34
15m
18m
13–17
15–20

4
3y
31–41
2y 2m
22–29

116

White, 152 P.3d at 365.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 1444.
118
DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS WASH. ST. (last visited Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.doc.wa.gov/corrections/justice/sentencing/default.htm [https://perma.cc/2DB3-EG45].
117

119

See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.510 (2018).
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3)(a) (2001), WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2018) (providing
that bail jumping is a class A felony when the underlying charge is murder in the first degree).
120

121

WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3)(b) (2001), WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2018) (providing
that bail jumping is a class B felony when the underlying charge is a class A felony that is not mu rder
in the first degree).
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Class C122

Bail Jump
Classification

III

SERIOUS
LEVEL

2m
1–3

5m
3–8

8m
4–12

11m
9–12

14m
12
+–16

5

6

OFFENSE SCORE
7

8

Class A

VI

3y 6m
36–48

4y 6m
46–61

5y 5m
57–75

6y 6m
67–89

9 or
more
7y 6m
77–102

Class B

V

3y 2m
33–43

4y
41–54

5y
51–68

6y
62–82

7y
72–96

Class C

III

20m
17–22

2y 2m
22–29

3y 2m
33–43

4y 2m
43–57

5y
51–68

Table 1 shows the relevant part of the Washington felony sentencing grid
with the matching bail jumping charge and serious level.
Washington determines sentencing ranges based on the seriousness of the
charge, categorized in “Serious Level,” and the defendant’s determined
offense score.123 The judge calculates the defendant’s offense score by
designating points for previous adult felonies, certain previous juvenile
dispositions, current offenses, the defendant’s status at the time the offense
was committed, and other statutory enhancements.124 The Washington
Caseload Forecast Council publishes annual sentencing statistical
summaries of adult felonies that reports the number and average sentences
associated with all felonies, including bail jumping.125
122
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3)(c) (2001), WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2018) (providing
that bail jumping is a class C felony when the underlying charge is a class B or C felony).
123
See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.520 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2018); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.525 (2017).
124
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.525 (2017); see also WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST

COUNCIL, WASH. ST. ADULT SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 293–295 (2017),
https://www.cfc.wa.gov/PublicationSentencing/SentencingManual/Adult_Sentencing_M
anual_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN89-4V3J].
125

WASH. ST. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, https://sgc.wa.gov/sentencing-guidelines-commission
(last visited Apr. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/S492-6RL5]; WASH. ST.
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Chart 1. Annual Number of Class B Felony Bail Jumping Sentences126

CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, https://www.cfc.wa.gov/default.htm (last visited Apr. 3,
2019) [https://perma.cc/PAC2-NA85].
126

WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, CRIM. JUST. PUBLICATIONS (last visited

Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.cfc.wa.gov/Publications.htm [https://perma.cc/2LSA-P37P] (this
chart is a compilation of all the reports filed under the Criminal Justice Publications);
Aleksandrea Johnson, Compilation of the Washington State Caseload Forecast Statistical
Summary of Adult Felony Sentencing Fiscal Years 1999-2019 Regarding Bail Jumping (Apr.
18, 2020) (unpublished data compilation) (on file with author).
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Chart 2. Annual Number of Class C Felony Bail Jumping Sentences127

Chart 3. Class B Felony Bail Jumping Average Sentence Length128

127

WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 126; Johnson, supra note 126, at 1-2.

128

WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 126; Johnson, supra note 126, at 1-2.
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Chart 4. Class C Felony Bail Jumping Average Sentence Length129

Out of the 24,257 felony sentences imposed in the 2019 fiscal year, there
were four Class B felony bail jumping sentences imposed and 305 Class C
felony bail jumping sentences imposed, as illustrated in Charts 1 and 2. 130 The
average sentence for the four class B felonies, as shown in Chart 3, was 41.3
months in prison.131 Sentences for Class C felony bail jumping, as shown in
Chart 4, included 124 prison sentences with an average of 29.8 months and

226 non-prison sentences, including jail sentences, for 2.9 months.132 A
review of all publications shows that there have been no convictions for a
class A bail jumping felony. 133 In misdemeanor bail jumping charges, the

129

WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 126; Johnson, supra note 126, at 1-2.

130

WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, STAT. SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY

SENT’G FISCAL YEAR 2019, vii, 14 (2019)
https://www.cfc.wa.gov/PublicationSentencing/StatisticalSummary/Adult_Stat_Sum_FY
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM4V-8Y8C].
Id.
Id.
133
See WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 126.
131
132
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maximum penalty is ninety days in jail and up to a $1,000 fine. 134 Finally,
and importantly, a judge can hold the person charged with bail jumping in
jail pretrial as a consequence of their failure to appear.

135

D. The Implications of a Bail Jumping Charge
Bail jumping charges have many implications on the criminal legal
system and the people charged. This section will discuss the consequences
of a bail jumping charge and conviction, the effects on marginalized
communities, and the way bail jumping impacts plea bargaining.
1.

Consequences of a Bail Jumping Charge and Conviction
Failing to appear to court, and thereby obtaining an outstanding bench
136

warrant, creates collateral consequences alone.
In addition to amplifying
collateral consequences, a bail jumping charge and conviction can have
devastating effects on sentencing, perceptions on a person’s criminal
history, and trust and confidence in the justice system.137 First, the
defendant can face increased sentencing implications on top of any pretrial
sanctions.138 It is also reasonable to expect that a person could be charged
and convicted of bail jumping even if the judge declines to punish the
defendant pretrial for their failure to appear. 139 This naturally can lead to
confusion and lack of trust in the justice system. 140
134

SNOHOMISH COUNTY PROSECUTING ATT’Y’S OFF., CHARGING AND DISPOSITION

STANDARDS 150 (2014) https://snohomishcountywa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/
16794/Charging-and-Disposition-Standards—2014 [https://perma.cc/8LUH-YUTG].
135
See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(k) (the court may revoke release and may order forfeiture of
any bond if a violation to pretrial conditions is proved by clear and convincing evidence).
136

Gouldin, supra note 28, at 694-95 (Defendants with outstanding warrants for failure to appear can
cause difficulty in securing legitimate and stable employment, obtaining and maintaining a driver’s
license, obtaining public benefits, additional fines and fees.).
137
See supra Sections IV & V.C.4; see also infra Section V.D.2.
138
See supra Section V.C.1 & Section V.C.4.
139
See supra Section V.C.1.
140
See supra Sections IV & V.D.2.
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Further, the additional bail jumping felony or misdemeanor record on a
person’s criminal history may affect their ability to obtain employment,
housing, or other benefits. Bail jumping is often mistakenly perceived as a
choice to deliberately disobey the court or avoid prosecution.141 An employer
with this perception could misunderstand that the failure to appear was instead a
result of sickness, lack of transportation, or some other legitimate excuse that
would not legally excuse the bail jumping charge in court.142

In effect, bail jumping doubly punishes a person for failing to appear in
court regardless of the reason. Because failure to appear encompasses both
people who abscond from prosecution and incarceration and those who miss
court due to lack of resources, organization, or competing obligations, a
person’s record of bail jumping or failure to appear can cause further
detention or punishment in future cases. For example, if someone misses
their court appearance because they were hospitalized, a judge in a future
prosecution will see the FTA on their record and take that into consideration
to determine whether someone is a flight risk. 143 Judges report that one of
the most important factors in pretrial release consideration is the number of
past FTAs.

144

Defendants with even one FTA on their record could be

denied release and bail, regardless of the reason why they failed to
appear.145 In Washington, as well as many other states, if a person is
charged with bail jumping, the judge will see both a FTA and a bail
jumping record.

146

This can lead to pretrial detention, or, if a person is

released, more restrictive and expensive pretrial release conditions, such as
travel restrictions or electronic monitoring. 147

141

See infra Section 0.0.0.
Myers, supra note 32, at 382.
143
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(c); Corey & Lo, supra note 12.
144
Corey & Lo, supra note 12.
145 Id.
146
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(c).
147
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(b), Corey & Lo, supra note 12.
142
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Communities that have higher rates of failure to appear warrants, charges, or
convictions, particularly including people who are indigent, those who suffer
from mental illness or addiction, or communities of color, are
disproportionately affected by these collateral consequences. Because of “the
overpolicing of communities of color . . . people from those communities are
likelier to have prior convictions or past FTAs, which lead to high scores on
pretrial risk algorithms.”148 A bail jumping conviction coupled with previous
FTAs, including the FTA that led to the bail jumping conviction, will be
considered by the judge and possibly lead to further detention or pretrial
restrictions that could hinder a person’s ability to assist in their own case,
maintain employment, or provide for their family and community.149
A bail jumping conviction can also compromise a person’s immigration
status. Under federal law, offenses relating to failure to appear for service of a
sentence and to court is considered an aggravated felony.150 Aggravated
felonies carry the most severe immigration consequences of any category of
crime.151 Convictions of aggravated felonies prevent noncitizens from
receiving relief that would spare them from deportation, including asylum, and
from being readmitted to the United States in the future. 152 The definition of
“aggravated felony” does not require the crime to be “aggravated” or a

148
Corey & Lo, supra note 12; see also, Madeleine Carlisle, The Bail–Reform Tool that Activists
Want Abolished, ATLANTIC (Sep. 21, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/the-bail-reform-tool-that-activists-wantabolished/570913/ [https://perma.cc/43X3-G84G] (“The number of times someone has been
convicted of a crime, for example, or their failure to appear in court could both be affected by racial
bias.”).
149
See supra Section V.C.1.
150
8 USC §1101(a)(43)(Q) (2014); 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(T) (2014).
151
Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1 (Dec. 2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/aggravated_felo
nies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZTV-RMJU].
152

Id.; see also Henriquez v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 70, 74 (2018) (finding that New York’s version of

the bail jumping statute constituted an aggravated felony and affirming the immigration judge’s
decision that Mr. Henriquez was ineligible for cancellation of removal).
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“felony” to qualify.153 Under immigration law, Congress determines what
constitutes an aggravated felony. 154 Today, “aggravated felonies” under
immigration law include many nonviolent and minor offenses, such as
failure to appear.155
The inclusion of bail jumping and failure to appear within the definition
of “aggravated felony” in an immigration context poses significant
problems for noncitizen individuals entangled in the criminal legal system
by making them more vulnerable to the coercive effects of the charge and to
removal and deportation proceedings, especially considering undocumented
individuals’ fears of encountering Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) agents in courthouses.156 The threat of a bail jumping charge may
thus force a noncitizen to enter into plea negotiations in an effort to avoid
immigration consequences. Even worse, if the underlying charge is
considered an aggravated felony and the noncitizen wishes to exercise their
constitutional right to a trial, the noncitizen may face an additional bail
jumping charge that is much more difficult to combat.157 Immigration
consequences for a bail jumping conviction as an aggravated felony include
deportation, removal proceedings, detention, and a loss of defenses and
waivers to prevent removal. 158
Bail jumping charges and convictions lead to unduly punitive and duplicative
consequences, especially to the most vulnerable and marginalized
communities.159 Despite the harsh consequences of a bail jumping conviction,
formal charges and convictions are fairly rare.160 The much more
153

AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 151, at 1.
Id.
155 Id.
156
See Ctr. for Hum. Rts., Justice Compromised: Immigration Arrests at Washington State
Courthouses, UNIV. OF WASH. (Oct. 16, 2019) https://jsis.washington.edu/
humanrights/2019/10/16/ice-cbp-courthouse-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/ZXT8-7TYN].
157
See discussion supra Section V.C.2.
158
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 151, at 2-3.
159
See discussion supra Section IV.
160
See supra text and graphs accompanying notes 117-135.
154
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common and nefarious use of the bail jumping statute is its effects on plea
bargaining.
2.

Coercive Plea Bargaining

Besides the collateral consequences to a bail jumping conviction, the
biggest problem with bail jumping is its susceptibility to coercive plea
bargaining. Not unlike the rest of the United States, the criminal legal
system in Washington State is, for the most part, a system of pleas, not a
system of trials.161 One key prosecutorial power is “the ability to control a
defendant’s sentencing exposure by manipulating the charges against
162

him.”

Charge bargaining is essentially an agreement to “replace a higher

charge with a lower one in exchange for the defendant’s promise to plead
guilty, which guarantees the prosecutor a conviction without the expense of
163

a trial.”

While this sounds like a mutually beneficial bargain, most

observers describe it as a coercive practice that produces involuntary pleas
and, at times, to crimes that the defendant did not commit. 164 This system
creates two problems: first, prosecutors hope to efficiently obtain their
preferred sentence; and second, charge bargaining results in the prosecutor
having overwhelming leverage and control over the defendant’s incentive to
plead guilty.165

161 See generally Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012)(… [C]riminal justice today is for
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.
134, 143–44 (2012) (citing Dept. of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.22.2009: “Ninety–seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety–four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); see
also WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 130, at 32 (finding that in
Washington State 95.5% of criminal cases were adjudicated through a guilty plea, 2.4%
adjudicated through a jury trial, and 2.1% adjudicated through bench trial).

162
Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1310
(2018).
163
Id. at 1311.
164 Id.
165
Id. at 1312.
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Unfortunately, no data set can concretely represent how a statute, such as
bail jumping, affects the plea-bargaining practice as all negotiations are
behind closed doors. However, public defenders and criminal defense
attorneys across the country acknowledge that bail jumping is often filed or
threatened to secure convictions.

166

Wisconsin is one state that is

contemplating the impacts of bail jumping charges on its residents.

167

Though Wisconsin has a different statutory scheme than Washington,
analyzing its effects may be useful in contemplating how to reform the
Washington bail jumping statute.168 One attorney in Wisconsin noted that
“[t]here are a lot of bail jumping charges issued in order to get an easy plea
or secure a conviction in a case where [the prosecution is] less likely to get
it.”169 Another Wisconsin attorney notes, “prosecutors can use a felony bail
charge as a hammer to coerce a defendant to accept a plea deal.”170
The Washington bail jumping statute produces the same result. In fact,
the Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney’s 2014 Charging and
Disposition Standards state how bail jumping is encouraged to be used as a
plea-bargaining tool:
It may be appropriate to decline to file bail jumping charges if the
defendant enters a guilty plea to the underlying charge with an
increased State’s sentencing recommendation. Likewise, bail jumping
charges may be dismissed in return for a plea of guilty to the
underlying charge if the defendant has not resisted return to this

166

See Murphy, supra note 3, at 1495-96; Gretchen Schuldt, Felony bail jumping — common and

unevenly applied, WIS. JUST. INITIATIVE (last visited Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.wjiinc.org/blog/felony-bail-jumping-common-and-unevenly-applied
[https://perma.cc/4Z6V-WTH4]; See also Amy Johnson, The Use of Wisconsin’s Bail Jumping
Statute: A Legal and Quantitative Analysis, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 619, 654–55 (2018).
167

See Johnson, supra note 166, at 655.
See WIS. STAT. § 946.49 (2018), Johnson, supra note 166, at 654-55.
169
Id. (citing Plea Bargaining from the Criminal Lawyer’s Perspective: Plea Bargaining in
Wisconsin, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 357, 363 (2007)).
170
Schuldt, supra note 166.
168
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jurisdiction and no major costs have been incurred to obtain the
defendant’s return.171
In the fall of 2019, the Washington Defender Association (WDA) sent
out a survey to its membership, the public, and contract defenders across the
state of Washington, to get a glimpse of how bail jumping is being used
172

particularly in plea negotiations.
There were 52 responses representing
21 out of the 39 counties in Washington State, including King, Skagit,
173

Snohomish, Clark, Whatcom, and Spokane counties.
Survey participants
indicated that in cases where their clients were formally charged with bail
174

jumping, the case often resulted in a plea bargain.
The survey
participants also indicated that prosecutors routinely threaten to file bail
jumping charges and that the bail jump charge is a key charge that
prosecutors use in plea negotiations. 175
When asked what impact the charge bail jumping has on their clients,
defenders indicated that the charge often prevents trials where there are good
legal or factual reasons to go trial.176 They also indicated that bail jump often
has worse sentencing consequences for their client than the underlying charge
that initially brought them to court.177 Defenders say that their clients often feel
helpless when they missed court for a good reason but are still
171
172

SNOHOMISH COUNTY PROSECUTING ATT’Y’S OFF., supra note 134, at 150.
WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 1; See also WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N (last

visited Mar. 31, 2019), https://defensenet.org/ [https://perma.cc/T4Y4-6E4M].The
Washington Defender Association (WDA) is an organization that is a “voice of the public
defense community and provides support for zealous and high–quality legal
representation by advocating for change, educating defenders, and collaborating with
other justice system stakeholders and the broader community to bring about just
solutions.” Id. The results of this survey are shared with the permission of Hillary
Behrman, WDA’s Director of Legal Services.
173

WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 1.
Id. at 2 (When asked how bail jump cases the participants represented were resolved, survey
participants reported that 21 percent reported a dismissal, 23 percent reported a guilty plea, 13
percent reported a trial, and 44 percent reported plea bargain.).
175
Id. at 6.
176
Id. at 7–8.
174

177

Id.
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facing additional prosecution.

178

They say that the added charge often

diminishes the client’s confidence in their attorney and the court institution
because it is so difficult to combat the charge, and it reinforces a rigidity
that does not account for an individual’s life circumstances.179
Defenders reported in the survey that the uncontrollable circumstances
defense is nearly impossible to combat against a bail jumping charge. 180 For
example, the defenders conveyed that the “uncontrollable circumstances”
defense failed in circumstances where their client had limited means of
transportation, including missing court due to a ferry shutdown, and where there
were conflicts between court dates.181 But despite presenting evidence of these
circumstances and barriers, defenders reported that these cases resulted in guilty
verdicts at trial.182 Further, survey participants noted that their clients usually
missed court because of issues related to indigency and rarely missed court to
prevent the administration of justice.183
Another common theme in the survey was that clients often feel pressured to
accept a plea agreement.184 Even if there is a strong case to combat the
underlying charge, the defenders reported that clients feel pressured to take a
plea because of how easy it is for the State to prove the elements in court. 185
Additionally, the participants say that their clients are often concerned about the
number of felony convictions and their devastating effects at sentencing. 186
Instead of one felony or misdemeanor charge, the client will be charged and
possibly convicted of the underlying charge as well as the
178

Id.

Id.
Id. at 4–6, 7–8.
Id. at 4–6.
182
Of the fifteen defenders who have represented clients charged with bail jumping, twelve reported
a guilty verdict on the bail jump charge, one reported a resolution before the verdict, one reported a
pending case, and one was dismissed prior to trial for prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id.
179

180
181

183

Id. at 4–6, 7–8.
Id.
185
Id. at 7–8.
184

186

Id.
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bail jumping charge.187 One defender noted that this is especially problematic
for clients that are undocumented because the number of felony charges may
impact an undocumented client’s ability to gain legal status or stay in the United
States.188 Each previous felony charge counts in calculating offense scores and
can affect present and future sentencing.189 As such, defenders say that clients
feel pressured to choose between a plea agreement that promises only one
felony conviction instead of potentially two felony convictions.190
Throughout the survey, defenders described different cases where the bail
jumping charge was threatened or used against their clients. 191 One client
missed court because she had to take her sick child to the doctor. 192 Because
the client, herself, was not sick, she faced bail jumping charges.193 Another
defender described a client who had significant challenges due to her physical
disability which led to multiple missed court dates.194 Despite awareness of
these challenges due to the client’s physical disability, the prosecutor threatened
to charge the client with several bail jumping charges until the client felt that
she had no other choice than to plead guilty to the underlying charge. 195
Defenders repeatedly reported in the survey that their clients faced
transportation and employment issues that lead to the use and threat of bail
jumping charges.196 Often, clients were faced with the choice to appear in court
or to maintain their employment.197 Even though prosecutors have discretion in
charging decisions, there is an indication that this specific charge pressures
defendants who may want to contest their charges or are

187

Id.

Id.
See WASH. REV. CODE §9.94A.525 (2017).
190
WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 7–8.
191
Id. at 4-8.
192
The Real World Impact of Criminalizing Failure to Appear, supra note 2, at 1.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196
See Id. at 1–2; see also WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 4–6.
197
WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 4-6.
188

189
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factually innocent, increases sentencing implications, and punishes people
for missing court under legitimate circumstances.
3.

198

Costs Associated with Bail Jumping

Aside from the sentencing and plea implications of bail jumping, there are
high costs associated with nonappearance and further incarceration. The Vera
Institute of Justice, a national organization committed to criminal legal and
prison reform, reported that in 2015, Washington State spent an average of
$37,841 per inmate with a prison population of 16,716 people.199 In 2016 and
2017, Washington State spent over $1 billion of its general funds on
corrections.200 This high cost does not include any pretrial costs, such as
increased “workloads and expenditures for the courts and law enforcement,”
like those caused by nonappearance.201 In addition to the systematic costs of
failure to appear, failure to appear imposes human and economic costs to the
defendant, “including pre–trial incarceration and increased fines for what
sometimes starts out a as a minor offense.”202 In addition, according to a study
of misdemeanants in King County, Washington, defendants that fail to appear
have, on average, twice as many hearings than those who appear in court. 203
Criminalizing nonappearance alone increases the costs already associated with
the issue of failure to appear. Instead of further punishing defendants who fail to
appear, decriminalizing nonappearance will reduce

198

Id.

199

Chris Mai & Ram Subramanian, The Price of Prisons: Examining State Spending Trends, 2010–

2015, VERA INSTIT. OF JUST. (2017), https://www.vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-2015state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-statespending-trends-prison-spending [https://perma.cc/5PY7-HRVA].
200

About Time: How Long and Life Sentences Fuel Mass Incarceration in Washington State, ACLU

OF

WASH. 4, 46 (2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/about-time-how-long-and-life-sentences-fuel-

mass-incarceration-washington-state [https://perma.cc/YK65-NXWC].
201

Rosenbaum et al., supra note 37, at 177.
Id. at 177.
203 Id. at 186.
202
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costs that could be used for programs that do effectively reduce failure to
appear rates.

VI. ABOLISHING THE CHARGE OF BAIL JUMPING AND
IMPROVING COURT APPEARANCE RATES
Washington State should abolish the bail jumping statute and rely on the
existing practices of bail and pretrial conditions reconsideration and contempt
processes, which address pretrial misconduct. The Washington State bench and
defense bar should also create a more robust practice regarding waivers of
appearances in court proceedings where the defendant’s presence is not
necessary. In addition to abolishing the bail jumping statute, Washington State
should continue to invest, encourage, and assist counties in establishing court
reminder systems and providing additional resources to dismantle the barriers to
attending court proceedings.

A.

Abolishing Bail Jumping

The Washington State legislature should repeal the bail jumping statute.
Abolishing the bail jumping statute is the most effective way to prevent the
coercive tactic of securing unfair plea agreements and is a step toward
dismantling harsh sentencing penalties. Abolishing the bail jumping statute
in no way inhibits the court from issuing a bench warrant to order the
defendant to court, reconsidering a defendant’s bail conditions upon failure
to appear, or using contempt proceedings for willful violations of pretrial
conditions. Eliminating the statute does, however, protect the defendant’s
right and wish to go to trial for the underlying offense, as well as promote
the judge’s discretion at sentencing for the crime charged.
Currently, there are three states that do not criminalize nonappearance:
Maryland, Mississippi, and Wyoming. 204 When a defendant fails to appear to
204
Rebecca Pirius, Pretrial Release Violations & Bail Forfeiture, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (June
28, 2018) http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/bail-forfeiture-procedures.aspx
[https://perma.cc/CV2Z-B7AV].
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court, Maryland, Mississippi, and Wyoming all execute similar processes as
Washington. The court will issue a bench warrant for a defendant’s arrest if they
fail to appear to court—a violation of their condition of pretrial release.205 After
the defendant presents before the court, the court will either revoke the
defendant’s pretrial release or continue the defendant’s pretrial release with or
without conditions.206 Maryland code expressly provides that the court must
strike a bail forfeiture if the defendant is returned to the jurisdiction of court
within ninety days and can show reasonable grounds for the failure to
appear.207 The courts can pursue criminal contempt proceedings when a person
obstructs the administration of justice or willfully disobeys the court’s lawful
order.208 In fact, in Wyoming, failure to appear is subject to contempt sanctions
rather than an additional criminal charge.209 The sanction may be imposed
when a person on pretrial release knowingly fails to appear to court and
provides the uncontrollable circumstances affirmative defense. 210 Though the
rule sounds similar to Washington’s bail jumping statute, it is not a statute that
adds an additional felony or misdemeanor charge for failure to appear; and it
goes through a separate contempt proceeding from the rest of the underlying
charges.211
205
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5–213(a) (West 2001); M ISS. CODE ANN. § 99–5–25 (West
2013); 3 MISS. PRAC., ENCYC. MISS. LAW § 24:26 (2nd ed.); WYO. CRIM. PROC. R.

3.1 (West 2018); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(k); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R.
3.2(j)(2).
206
MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 5–213(b) (West 2001); M ISS. CODE ANN. § 99–5–25 (West
2013); 3 MISS. PRAC., ENCYC. MISS. LAW § 24:26 (2nd ed.); WYO. CRIM. PROC. R.

3.1 (West 2018); WYO. CRIM. PROC. R. 46 (West 2018).
207

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC § 5–208(b)(1) (West 2001); 2A M D. ENCYC. ARREST §

73 (2018) (“‘Reasonable grounds’ means something less stringent than an absolutely
compelling reason, and is not restricted to instances in which there was not a willful
default.”); 2A MD. ENCYC. ARREST §74 (2018), Allegheny Mut. Cas. Co. v. State, 368
A.2d 1032, 1034 (1977) (holding that the 90–day grace period for a surety to bring a
defendant to court starts when the defendant fails to appear and the court announces
forfeiture).
208

MISS R. CRIM. PROC. R. 32.1(d) (2018).
WYO. CRIM. PROC. R. 46.4 (West 2018).
210 Id.
211
WYO. CRIM. PROC. R. 42 (West 2003).
209
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Washington courts could easily address the situation where a person fails
to appear to court with the intent to obstruct the administration of justice by
addressing the individual’s bail conditions or through contempt
proceedings— both of which are already existing court practices in
response to pretrial misconduct.

212

Judges already take into account a

person’s prior FTAs in bail considerations and revocations, regardless of
whether the individual was previously convicted of bail jumping.

213

In

current practice, for example, a judge has the discretion not to punish a
person for failure to appear by revoking their bail-bond or instating further
pre-trial conditions if they determine that the person’s failure to appear is a
consequence of conditions such as poverty, caregiver, or employment
214

obligations.
Despite the judge’s decision not to punish, the prosecution
still has the discretion to criminally charge a defendant for missing court,
regardless of the defendant’s reasons for missing court.215 Abolishing the
statute altogether will help decrease the number of people incarcerated from
bail jumping sentences and guilty pleas, protect defendants from the
pressure to plead guilty, and challenge the narrative that punishment
actually encourages court appearance.
There are surely ways to reduce bail jumping’s harsh consequences
without completely eliminating the statute. Eliminating the uncontrollable
circumstances affirmative defense would allow broader common law
defenses, such as necessity. For example, the Washington State Legislature
could include the original language of “without lawful excuse” and define
“lawful excuse” in the statutory scheme—something the Washington State
legislature opted not to do after the Washington Supreme Court found the

212

12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASH. PRAC. & PROC. § 411 (3d ed. 2019).
12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASH. PRAC. & PROC. § 408 (3d ed. 2019); WASH. SUPER. CT.
CRIM. R. 3.2(c); see supra Section IV.
214
See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(k).
215
See discussion supra Section V.D.2.
213
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language unconstitutionally vague.

216

This solution may allow the statute to

apply the way it was originally intended to apply—to target those who
intentionally fail to appear to court.217 A higher mens rea requirement of
intent will also target the statute towards people who are actually
absconding from the administration of justice and increase the State’s
burden in proving bail jumping.218 Including specific language in the statute
such as “intent to avoid adjudication or service of a sentence” would limit
prosecution to those individuals who intend to abscond and obstruct justice.
Declassifying the statute to make bail jumping a misdemeanor would
decrease the sentencing implications for a bail jumping conviction.

219

Adding a provision to the statute that would prohibit the use of bail jumping
where the underlying charge is dismissed is another way to resolve the
unfair practices surrounding bail jumping.
Despite these amendments, repealing the statute entirely is the best solution.
Even if the statute is reformed to reduce the consequences of a bail jumping
conviction, it does not address the major problem with bail jumping—its use to
induce guilty pleas. Increasing the mens rea requirement from knowingly to
intentionally may not be a viable fix for this problem. The Wisconsin statute
provides an intentional mens rea requirement, yet it is still used as a
prosecutorial tool to induce guilty pleas.220 Reforming the statute does not
address the additional costs and implications of incarceration, as well as
challenges with imposing legal financial obligations against who miss
216
See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1975); Hilt, 662 P.2d at 53; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
276, § 82A (1994); see also Commonwealth v. Gomez, 940 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Love, 530 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (definition of “without
sufficient excuse” as “deliberate conduct contrary to that which was required – this in distinction
from conduct which the actor did not will, or was unable to control.”).
217
218

See LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 13, at 329-31.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(12) (2011), WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(a) (2009).

219

Pirius, supra note 204.
See WIS. STAT. § 946.49 (2018); see also Murphy, supra note 3, at 1495-96; Schuldt, supra note
166; Johnson, supra note 166, at 654-55.
220
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court for wholly legitimate reasons. The bottom line is that there is already
a recourse for failing to appear to court—failure to appear bench warrants
and a reconsideration of a person’s bail and pretrial conditions.221 It is
unduly punitive to further punish the defendant with either an additional
charge or with coercing a plea agreement when the defendant was likely not
deliberately disobeying the court. Instead of further criminalization for
failure to appear, the state of Washington should abolish the bail jumping
statute and focus on investing in proactive, community-based efforts that
are shown to increase court appearance rates.
B. Reducing the Burden of Mandatory Court Appearances in
Criminal Cases
In addition to abolishing the bail jumping statute, judges should
reconsider their practice in requiring some court appearances. Superior
Court rules state a “defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every
stage of the trial including the empaneling of the jury and the return of the
verdict, and at the imposition of sentence,”222 but in practice, defendants
are generally required to be at every pretrial court date between arraignment
and trial.223 Washington Superior Court Rule 3.4 requires, when necessary,
a defendant’s presence at “arraignment, at every stage of the trial including
the empaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and the imposition
of the sentence” unless otherwise excused or excluded by the court with
good cause.224 When the defendant is not present, but their personal
attendance is necessary, the court may issue a bench warrant.225

221

See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4.
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(a).
223
WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1 (Survey participants indicate that despite Rule
222

3.4, judges and the State generally expect defendants to be at every court date even if the
defendant’s presence is actually unnecessary).
224
225

WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(a).
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(c).
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Though judges are permitted to require the defendant to attend every
court date, judges should consider requiring the defendant’s attendance only
where attendance is actually necessary. Certainly, it is necessary for the
defendant to attend their arraignment, trial, and sentencing as dictated by
the Superior Court Rule and in adherence with the defendant’s
constitutional rights.

226

It may also be necessary for the defendant to attend

certain pretrial motion hearings.

227

However, there are many hearings that

do not necessitate the defendant’s presence. For example, the defendant’s
presence may not be necessary at certain pretrial hearings that have to do
with purely legal or scheduling-related issues. A prior study on
misdemeanants in King County found that people “who fail to appear for a
pretrial hearing have, on average, twice as many hearings as those who
appear.”228 Judges should consider the time and resources that it takes for
many defendants to appear in court as the number of court appearances
required places a heavy burden particularly on people who lack the
resources and ability to attend numerous court appearances.
Creating a better practice of waivers of appearances may be helpful in
transforming the criminal court’s expectations of defendant appearance.
Waivers of appearance allow a defendant to waive their right to appear at a
particular court date, often done as waivers of arraignment in courts of limited
jurisdiction.229 Defenders could implement a more robust practice in having
their clients sign these waivers prior to a hearing to help alleviate the burden of
appearance. Creating a more robust practice of waivers of appearance may
encourage better communication between defenders and their clients. Defenders
can also create a more robust practice of requesting telephonic or video
conference proceedings.230 However, this may also create
226

WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4; See also Allen, 397 U.S. at 338; Stincer. 482 U.S. at

745.
Id.
Rosenbaum et al, supra note 201, at 186.
229
See WASH. CT. LTD. JURISDICTION CRIM. R. 4.1(g).
230
See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(d).
227
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a heavier burden on public defenders with higher caseloads as it would require a
change of practice and more follow-up with clients after they are released from
custody. It would also require the prosecutor and the judge to consent to the
waiver, which may not always be possible based on the specific charge and
jurisdiction. While this is not a robust solution to the structural issues of
requiring appearance and charging bail jumping, it is a daily practice that could
alleviate the impacts of bail jumping and the burden of attending many court
hearings, particularly for indigent defendants.

Aside from allowing the practice of appearance by counsel with a signed
waiver, Washington courts should consider the defendant’s individual
circumstances before setting additional court dates, particularly pretrial
case-setting court dates. The court system can establish trust and confidence
with defendants and the public by providing more flexibility regarding court
appearances. Such may also help defendants long-term in retaining
employment, engaging in treatment programs, and meeting other
obligations by reducing the burden of attending frequent court hearings
where their presence is ultimately unnecessary. Recognizing the defendant’s
life conditions and solely requiring appearance where it is absolutely
necessary help eliminate burdens and barriers to the court.
C. Investing in Proactive Efforts to Increase and Encourage
Court Appearance
There is no evidence that punishment effectively encourages court
appearance.231 But there is a breadth of evidence showing that court reminder
systems are extremely effective in reducing FTA rates, thus eliminating the risk
of criminal punishment for bail jumping.232 Washington State, counties, and
courts should continue to fund, expand, and experiment with reminder systems.
In addition to bolstering that practice, Washington State should further its
efforts to provide increased flexibility for defendants to appear and
231
232

See Murphy, supra note 3, at 1459.
See infra Section VI.1.
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alleviating the holistic and systemic reasons why people miss court. While
these are not all legal solutions, it is important for these changes to coincide
with abolishing the bail jumping statute in order to accomplish what the bail
jumping statute ultimately fails to do: improve court appearance.
1.
Court Reminder Systems Effectively Increase Court
Appearance Rates
Courts across the country are experimenting with reminder systems,
indicating a realization that people primarily miss court for life-related
reasons, rather than absconding from justice. 233 Courts utilize three main
reminder systems: postcards, reminder phone calls, and text messaging
systems.
Postcards are a relatively common option shown to reduce failure to appear
rates. One study in Nebraska found that postcard reminders significantly
reduced FTA rates.234 There is much debate on the kind of written messages
that are most effective in encouraging court appearance. 235 Another study on
Nebraska’s postcard reminder system found, for instance, that a reminder with
more information on the possible sanctions of failing to appear is more effective
than a simple reminder.236 The study indicated that reminders with harsh,
negative messaging were the most effective message for reducing FTA rates
across the three racial groups studied.237 In the Nebraska study, researchers
found that “a reminder was most effective for defendants relatively low in
trust.”238 As mentioned in Section IV of this article, people with low trust and
confidence in the courts make up some of the demographic

233

See discussion supra Section IV.
Tomkins et al., supra note 19, at 105.
235
Bornstein et al., supra note 31, at 77-78.
236
Id. at 76.
237
Id. (“The sanctions condition reduced the FTA rate by 3.7% for Whites, 5.2% for Blacks, and
5.8% for Hispanics; these reductions were statistically significant for Whites and Hispanics, but not
for Blacks.”).
238
Id. at 77.
234
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that fails to appear to court.239 This finding shows that written reminders
have “the potential to equalize appearance rates for defendants who vary in
their attitudes toward the criminal justice system.”240 The implications for
these positive findings of written reminders include improvements of
system efficiencies, cost-savings through better compliance, improvements
in defendants’ perceptions of the courts, and reductions in racial and ethnic
disparities in the criminal legal system.

241

However, there are also some limitations to postcard use. One of the
target populations facing the issue of bail jumping and high rates of failure
to appear are indigent populations.

242

Some of these people may be

homeless without a reliable address to receive reminders through mail. That
said, this consideration does not disqualify postcard reminders from being a
part of the solution to failure to appear and bail jumping if it is implemented
in addition to other systems.
Reminder phone calls are another mechanism shown to reduce failure to
appear rates. One program in Jefferson County, Colorado, highlights the
effectiveness of pre-FTA and post-FTA phone calls in reducing failure to
appear rates.243 Citing the progress in King County, Washington’s live-caller
program results, decreasing failure to appear rates by sixty percent, Jefferson
County opted to further test the efficacy of live-call reminder systems.244 The
program also opted to test the efficacy of call-ahead reminders, to reduce failure
to appears, and call-after reminders, to notify defendants about how to take care
of their FTA warrant.245 The study found that use of call-ahead, live reminder
calls reduced the failure to appear rate by forty-three percent,
239

See supra Section IV.
Bornstein et al., supra note 31, at 77.
241
Id. at 78.
242
See discussion supra Section IV.
243
Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones, & Dorian M. Wilderman, Increasing Court-appearance
Rates and Other Benefits of Live–Caller Telephone Court–Date Reminders: The Jefferson County, 48
J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N. 86, 90 (2012).
244
Id. at 88.
245
Id. at 89–90.
240
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increasing the court-appearance rate to eighty-eight percent.246 The live-call
after phone calls lead to an increase of people addressing their FTA warrants
from ten to fifteen percent.247 Besides the court appearance benefits, the study
found that the live-call system enhanced the court’s customer service by
increasing communication between the court and defendants, and helped answer
defendants’ questions about the court and how to contact other related
agencies.248 The calls also helped to “generally allay the fears of defendants
who may be intimidated by the criminal justice system.”249 Employing
programs like this may help address one reason why people miss court by
improving a defendant’s trust and confidence in the system.250

Like the limitations with the postcard system, the live-call-reminder
system may be limited in efficacy for those who do not have access to a
telephone—though there are programs for low-income people to access cell
phones.

251

In addition, lack of language options may limit live phone call

options. Further, live caller systems are most often implemented in court
clerks’ offices and may impede the attorney-client relationship and
communication.252 Nonetheless, live-call reminder systems result in higher
court appearance rates and is a viable option to addressing the reasons why
people fail to appear to court.
Text message reminders are another innovative solution to improve court
appearance rates. One newly implemented text-messaging reminder service

246

Id. at 89.
Id. at 89–90.
248
Id. at 92.
249 Id.
250
BORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 28.
251
FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N, LIFELINE SUPPORT FOR AFFORDABLE COMMC’NS (last visited Apr. 3,
2019)
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/lifeline-support-affordable-communications
[https://perma.cc/6QUF-CJ96].
252
See generally Marla Sandys & Heather Pruss, Correlates of Satisfaction Among Clients of a
Public Defender Agency, 14 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 431, 443-44 (2017) (discussing literature
indicating communication between defense attorney and client increasing trust and satisfaction in
representation).
247
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is utilized in Spokane County, Washington.253 The new service was funded
as a result of a $1.75 million grant through the MacArthur Foundation for
the purpose of reducing jail populations and addressing racial and ethnic
254

disparities in the criminal legal system.
This resulted in a contract with
Uptrust, a San Francisco-based company that facilitates text message-based
communications to remind defendants about their court dates and
mandatory appointments.255 One of the major benefits of Uptrust is that it
connects with the county’s public defense system, fostering better
256

communication with defendants and their counsel.
To track its
effectiveness, Uptrust collects data on failure to appear rates before and
257

after implementing the system.
Based on its data, Uptrust has found that
its services have “reduced failure-to-appear rates to less than 10% in most
counties it works with and has reduced failure-to-appear rates by 50% in
some jurisdictions.”258 Uptrust’s services also help connect defendants with
existing county resources—such as community oriented child care services
and transportation.259 As an additional benefit to the cost-saving advantages
of reducing bench warrants and arrests because of increased court
260

appearance, there is no cost to defendants for using this system.
The text message reminder systems face similar limitations as the live-call
reminder system. People who are indigent may not have access to a mobile
253
LeAnn Bjerken, New Text Service Aims to Keep Defendants Out of Jail, SPOKANE J. BUS. (Sept.
27, 2018), https://www.spokanejournal.com/local-news/new-text-service-aims-to-keep-defendantsout-of-jail/ [https://perma.cc/29DZ-YWBL]; Mitch Ryals, Spokane County Public Defenders to
Begin Sending Text Reminders for Court Dates, INLANDER (Jul. 25, 2018, 4:07 PM),
https://www.inlander.com/spokane/spokane-county-public-defenders-to-begin-sending-textreminders-for-court-dates/Content?oid=11081301 [https://perma.cc/9FAA-5TZQ]; UPTRUST (last
visited Mar. 31, 2019), http://www.uptrust.co/ [https://perma.cc/X99W-4ATD].
254

259

Bjerken, supra note 253; Ryals, supra note 253.
UPTRUST, supra note 253.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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phone to receive text messages, though there are programs that help pay for
261

mobile phones for low-income people.

Language barriers may also be

applicable here and is a concern that needs to be addressed in its
implementation. The public defender-based system, while helpful in aiding
in the attorney-client relationship, may impose a further burden on already
busy public defender offices. But like the other proposed systems, the text
message-based reminder system shows promising results in improving court
appearance rates and should be further explored and invested in.
Of course, there are monetary and human costs for implementing reminder
systems. A public defense-centered system is preferred to avoid confidentiality
and conflict of interest issues and to promote the attorney-client relationship and
communication.262 A public defense-centered system collaterally promotes a
policy interest by encouraging defendants to communicate with their
attorneys.263 Further, a defendant’s attorney is likely the best equipped-person to
aid their clients when a FTA is an issue. There is a cost to integrate public
defender systems with the new technology. As a practical matter, human and
financial costs will come from each county that implements these innovative
systems and may be supplemented by grants.264
However, it is critical that these systems do not meaningfully impact the
county’s public defense budget to a degree that it impacts defender’s abilities to
provide effective assistance of counsel. Funding for public defense is already
limited and further strapping offices in order to effectively assure
communication and appearance would be a disservice to those in need of public
defense services.265 Despite the high costs to implement technological
261

FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N, supra note 251.
See Sandys & Pruss, supra note 252.
263 Id.
264
See WASH. REV. CODE. § 10.101.050 (2005); Bjerken, supra note 253; Ryals, supra note 253 (for
example, Spokane County Public Defenders funded its project with Uptrust in part with a $1.75
million grant through the MacArthur Foundation).
265
See generally William L. Downing, Ample Funding for Public Defenders Makes Justice
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Work for All, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017 3:22 PM)
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/ample-funding-for-public-defenders-makes-
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solutions to help increase appearance rates, the savings of less incarceration
and issuance of bench warrants will make up for the upfront costs. For
example, Uptrust estimates that the cost of each failure to appear incident is
about $1,000, considering issuing and enforcing bench warrants and pretrial incarceration.

266

Defender-based text message reminder systems also

alleviate costs affecting the attorney-client relationship by promoting
communication, and costs affecting the defendant as failures to appear can
impact their ability to maintain employment and their families.
2.

Eliminating Barriers to Accessing the Courts

There are many creative, community-driven solutions to break the barriers
that prevent people from attending their court dates. One example is Denver,
Colorado’s Outreach Court.267 In response to high failure-to-appear rates, the
City and County of Denver recognized that the homeless population faced
barriers to attending their court appearances for reasons such as lack of bus fare,
transportation, mental illness, or substance abuse problems. 268 In response,
Denver decided to bring the court to the Denver Rescue Mission to increase the
likelihood that people who were homeless could come to court. 269 Clinicians
are also available to offer mental health counseling and information on drug
treatment, and to help gain access to health care. 270 While Denver’s Outreach
Court is utilized for municipal cases, and not cases that would qualify for bail
jumping as seen in Washington, it is one example
justice-work-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/73TE-Q9LC]; see generally Derek Young, State
Must Pay Up for Public Defenders, Pronto, NEWS TRIBUNE (Jan. 7, 2018 12:56 PM),
https://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/article193233109.html
[https://perma.cc/M2XU-NVZE].
266
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Mission,
DENVER
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(Apr.
27,
2017
11:30
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https://www.denverpost.com/2017/01/27/homeless-outreach-court-denver-rescue-mission/
[https://perma.cc/42JL-2AW9].
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of an innovative way for the courts to facilitate proceedings to encourage
appearance and dismantle barriers.271 A program like that in Denver may also
help improve confidence in the courts, thus improving appearance rates.

Another example of a community-driven action is providing childcare in
or near courthouses, a solution that is now becoming more common across
the United States. One example is the Children’s Waiting Room in San
272

Francisco, which is now the standard for all new courthouses.
San
Francisco’s Children’s Waiting Rooms provides free, quality daycare for all
who attend court.

273

One Superior Court Commissioner noted that many

who missed hearings in Superior Court reported that it was because no one
274

was available to watch their children and they could not afford childcare.
Even though this solution is becoming more common, it should be
expanded across all courthouses to dismantle another common barrier for
people appearing in court.
There are many other ways that Washington could invest and strategize to
increase court appearance rates without punishment. Though the strategies can

be costly, “these costs are insignificant in comparison to the financial and social
costs

associated

with

nonappearance.”275

Surely,

“locally-developed,

compassionate, and responsive to the specific needs of defendants” is a court
system that Washington State courts can strive for through investing in such
innovative models to address nonappearance rates.276
271
Id.; see also Luis A. Almodovar & Stacy Shor McNally, Are You Worried About Going to Jail?
The Public Defender’s Office Homeless Outreach Program, 36 STETSON L. REV.

183 (2006) (Unlike Denver’s Outreach court, one program in Florida, that created a
model for other programs, assists people who fail to appear for court hearings on
misdemeanors, felonies, and violations of probation).
272
Kathleen Guthrie, Small Spaces, Big Hearts: Visiting San Francisco Courts’ Children’s Waiting
Rooms,
SAN
FRANCISCO
ATTORNEY
41,
41
(2011),
https://www.sfbar.org/forms/sfam/q42011/childrens-waiting-room.pdf
[https://perma.cc/972PQ3UM].
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Id. at 42.
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Id. at 43-44.
275
Bernal, supra note 3, at 570.
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Id. at 569.
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VII. RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY,
DETERRENCE, AND EXISTING RULES
There are three main arguments against this article’s call for bail jumping
abolition, including arguments that bail jumping charges contribute to public
safety, that bail jumping charges effectively deter FTAs, and that there are
already existing rules preventing coercive plea bargaining. Despite these
arguments, abolishing the bail jumping statute and investing in practices and
structures that encourage court appearance are more just solutions.

A.

Public Safety

Some may criticize the call to abolish the bail jumping statute as a threat
to public safety. Critics may say that decriminalizing nonappearance will
result in more offenders on the street with zero repercussions for missing
court. However, the crime of bail jumping offers no effective public safety
measure. Because bail jumping is an independent criminal charge that does
not impact the process of bench warrants, bail or pretrial condition
reconsideration, or contempt processes, those who miss court can still be
arrested and brought to court in absence of a bail jumping charge. A bail
jumping charge only occurs if the prosecutor decides to bring charges of
bail jumping.277 A repeal of bail jumping does not preclude the judge from
reconsidering the defendant’s bail or pretrial release conditions.278 For
example, if an individual misses court and is apprehended, the judge can
decide to impose more stringent supervision conditions, including jail. 279
Additionally, the judge is still going to consider the defendant’s prior
conduct, regardless of whether the defendant was actually charged or
convicted of prior bail jumping. Those considerations will inform the judge
in pretrial detention and release decisions in new criminal cases.

277

See discussion supra Section III.
See discussion supra Section V.D.
279
See discussion supra Section V.D.1.
278
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Those most likely effected by the bail jumping charge are those with
misdemeanors or low-level felonies, which usually do not include
allegations of violence. 280 In general, “felony defendants are less likely than
misdemeanor defendants to have the opportunity to FTA, because they are
281

often in custody.”

In fact, out of the 24,257 felony sentences imposed by

Washington courts in the 2019 fiscal year, there were only four cases that
involved the charge “Bail Jumping with a class A felony.”282 In addition, the
policy objectives of the statute had less to do with public safety and more to
do with encouraging defendants to appear at their scheduled court dates.
B.

283

Deterrence
Some critics against abolishing the bail jumping statute may say that the

charge is actually deterring absconders and improving appearance rates. The
reality is, however, that criminalizing nonappearance does not serve as effective
deterrence. Studies on nonappearance have shown that nonappearance rates
have remained stable over the last few decades even with the enforcement of
new laws criminalizing nonappearance.284 Furthermore, research on the theory
of deterrence shows a “limited disputed link between the length of sentences
and an increased deterrent effect—on either the individual or community level”
in part because of the inconsistency of sanctions, arbitrariness, and bias in the
criminal legal system.285 Washington judges, prosecutors, and the United States
generally need to move away from the narrative that further punitive action for
those who miss court due to symptoms related to poverty, mental illness,
addiction, or lack
280

See Bornstein, supra note 31, at 78.

Id.
WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 130, at 34.
283
See Coucil, 210 P.3d at 1061.
284
Bernal, supra note 3, at 544 (“For example, Bryne and Stowell found that ‘there were no changes
in... the percentage of defendants who failed to appear in court (2.3 percent vs.
281
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2.2 percent)’ from 1994 to 2003, even though major legislation criminalizing nonappearance
passed during that time.”).
285
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of trust, will encourage them to attend court. The data does not support the
belief “as research shows that sanctions alone are not a very powerful
286

means to get people to obey the law.”

Rather, we must be more creative

with our tax dollars and enact policies that actually address the barriers to
attending court.
C.

Rules Against Prosecutorial Vindictiveness

Prosecutors may argue that the use of charging or threatening to charge bail
jumping is within their discretion and not itself coercive. Further, prosecutors
may argue that there are already rules against prosecutorial misconduct and
vindictiveness that curb unfair and coercive charging, and those rules are
effectively reducing situations in which where bail jumping may be charged.
Prosecutorial vindictiveness, prohibited by constitutional due process principles,
happens when the State acts against a defendant in response to the defendant
exercising their constitutional or statutory rights.287 But the Washington
Supreme Court ruled that adding additional charges after failed plea
negotiations does not constitute prosecutorial vindictiveness.288 The United
States Supreme Court previously held that a defendant’s due process rights are
not violated where a prosecutor makes explicit threats during plea negations if a
defendant refuses to plead guilty to an original charge.289 The Court reasoned
that the defendant is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer and the
prosecution has the discretion to charge if they have probable cause to believe
that the defendant committed the offense.290
The Washington Court of Appeals has also rejected arguments that adding
bail jumping charges after failed plea negotiations amounts to prosecutorial

286

Bornstein et al., supra note 31, at 76.
State v. Korum, 141 P.3d 13, 21 (Wash. 2006) (citing U.S. v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 1245 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
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vindictiveness.291 In State v. Aguilar, for instance, Mr. Aguilar was arrested for
failing to maintain contact with his attorney during the pretrial process.292 After
Mr. Aguilar was unsuccessful in negotiating a plea agreement with the State, his
case proceeded to jury trial.293 The prosecution then amended the information
to charge Mr. Aguilar with bail jumping.294 Since the bail jumping charge was
supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals found that the
prosecution’s action was fully justified as a legitimate response to perceived
criminal conduct. 295 The prosecution plainly has the discretion to leverage
additional charges against a defendant in plea negotiations. 296
Although the courts do not consider prosecutorial practices, such as what is
occurring with the bail jumping statute in Washington State, as prosecutorial
misconduct or vindictiveness, the bail jumping charge certainly results in the
leveraging of plea deals, and defendants choosing to plead guilty rather than go
to trial. Thus, the issue with bail jumping is whether, in the interest of the fair
administration of justice, it is right and ethical to give the prosecution the tools
to induce guilty pleas, or otherwise give them the power to charge a defendant
with an offense that they are almost certain to win at trial, instead of proactively
addressing the issues underlying nonappearance. The issue with bail jumping is
whether the charge serves the policy objectives that it was enacted to
accomplish. It clearly does not.

There is further evidence that the use of bail jumping as a prosecutorial
plea-bargaining tool is not what the statute intended. The use of the bail
291

See State v. Aguilar, 223 P.3d 1158, 1164 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
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See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364-65 (“In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable
cause to believe that the defendant committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or
not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion…. To hold that the prosecutor’s desire to induce a guilty plea is an ‘unjustifiable standard,’
which, like race or religion, may play no part in his charging decision would contradict the very
premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining itself.”).
292
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jumping statute is “not intended to add or diminish the punishment
297

associated with the underlying offense.”

Where bail jumping is utilized

as a plea-bargaining tool, it adds an additional punishment associated to the
underlying offense. It impacts a defendant’s decision on whether to
continue fighting the underlying charge or to agree to a plea bargain that
does not include the sentencing implications of the bail jumping charge. It
makes the defendant choose between one felony charge with a possible
successful defense or two felonies where the bail jumping charge is
extremely likely to result in a conviction. While the use of the bail jumping
statute may not rise to the level prosecutorial vindictiveness, it is certainly
misused to induce pleas. The prosecution has the power to do this, but the
practice does not effectively address the objective of meaningfully
encouraging court appearance and the fair administration of justice, and
thus should no longer be a prosecutorial tool.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Criminalizing nonappearance will never fulfill the promise of encouraging
court appearance. Rather, bail jumping only serves as a prosecutorial tool to
leverage plea agreements over those most affected by access barriers, including
people who are indigent; people who lack access to transportation or safe,
affordable day care; and people with mental illness, addiction, or disabilities.
Eliminating the bail jumping statute will reduce the impact of coercive plea
tactics and convictions for nonappearance, which largely affect people facing
symptoms of poverty. Repealing bail jumping is also a step towards reducing
incarceration and its associated costs. Another step in reducing costs and
alleviating the burden on the state, courts, and people accused of crime would
manifest in the implementation of a more robust practice by the Washington
bench and defense bar of limiting mandatory court appearances to only those
proceedings where a defendant’s presence is

297
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actually necessary. At the same time, greater investments in community
resources that are shown to improve court appearance rates and trust in court
institutions, like reminder systems, should be effectuated to accomplish what
the bail jumping charge failed to do for the last forty years. Until we eliminate
the barriers people face in their attempts to appear to court and recognize the
complexities of failure to appear, we will not see improved appearance rates in
court. In the end, we must strive for a more compassionate and, consequently, a
more just court system that addresses the reasons why people fail to appear
rather than punish them for simply being human.

IX.

2020 UPDATE REGARDING E.S.H.B. 2231

On March 18, 2020, Governor Jay Inslee signed Engrossed Substitute
House Bill 2231—significantly reforming the charge of bail jumping to
298

address some of the issues discussed in this article.
While E.S.H.B. 2231
does not abolish the charge of bail jumping as this article proposes, it has
the potential to significantly reduce the coercive impact the charge has in
plea bargaining situations.299 It gives advocates and courts reasonable,
workable tools to address the missed court hearing without the threat of
another criminal charge.300 This update addresses the various changes to
the bail jumping statute and areas for further reform.
First, E.S.H.B. 2231 breaks the current bail jumping statute into two
separate charges—bail jumping and failure to appear.

301

The State may

charge an individual with bail jumping or failure to appear depending on the
underlying criminal charge.302 Besides eligibility based on the underlying

298
See E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); Gov. Jay Inslee, Bill Action, WASH.
GOV. JAY INSLEE (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:51 PM), https://www.governor.wa.gov/ officegovernor/official-actions/bill-action [https://perma.cc/TXA9-FALK].
299
S. REP. E.S.H.B 2231, at 3-4 (Wash. 2020).
300
E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020).
301 Id.
302
See id.
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crime, the statutes are quite similar in scheme.303 The State may charge an
individual who has missed with “bail jump” if they are “held for, charged
with, or convicted of a violent offense sex offense” as defined by statute, or
fails to appear for their trial.

304

The bail jumping charge retains the same
305

felony classification scheme as discussed in this article.
The State may
charge an individual who misses court with the misdemeanor of “failure to
appear” if they are charged with any crime not designated as a violent or sex
306

offense under the statute.
Both statutes state that an individual must
receive written notice of the requirement to appear at the person’s next court
307

date in order to be charged with bail jumping or failure to appear.
The
statutes change the uncontrollable circumstances affirmative defense from
“in reckless disregard of the requirement to appear” to “by negligently
disregarding the requirement to appear.”308
The most significant reform to the bail jumping/FTA charge is the
institution of a thirty-day window to allow for the quashing of any warrant
issued and the rescheduling of the missed hearing.309 If an individual who
misses court quashes their failure to appear warrant within thirty days, the
State cannot charge the individual with bail jumping or FTA.

310

This is a

significant step forward in reducing the coercive effect and harsh sentencing
implications of the previous statute for individuals charged with crimes
across the state. It takes a step toward restoring the original legislative intent
of only focusing on individuals who are absconding from justice.
While this bill is an improvement to the prior construction of the bail
jumping statute, there are still additional reforms that Washington State must
303

Id.

304

Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE 9.94A.030 (2019).
E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); see also discussion supra Sections V.A,
V.C.2.
306
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consider to truly resolve the problem of the criminalization of failure to
appear and remove the barriers preventing access to the courts. One such
needed reform is removing the felony classification structure in the bail
jumping statute. Individuals who would be eligible for the bail jumping
charge are less likely to miss court than those charged with lower level
311

felonies or misdemeanors.

Continuing a felony charging scheme

inherently preserves the harsh sentencing and immigration consequences for
failure to appear.

312

Another step towards reform of the new bail jumping

and FTA statutes would be to remove the uncontrollable circumstances
defense. It is unclear whether the change from reckless disregard to
313

negligent disregard will change the usefulness of the affirmative defense.
In fact, it is possible that the negligence standard makes the uncontrollable
affirmative defense more unworkable because it lowers the standard of
analyzing whether the person’s actions contributed to the failure to
appear.314 Eliminating the affirmative defense entirely will enable
individuals to utilize the broader necessity defense.315
Washington State must also continue to reduce the number of required court
appearances for justice-involved individuals across the state. Even with these
changes to the bail jumping statute, many individuals will continue to choose
between attending their many court appearances and going to work.316 WDA is
proposing changes to court rules regarding the defendant’s presence at court
hearings that “would allow defendants to appear through their

311

See Bornstein, supra note 26, at 78.
See discussion supra Sections V.C.4, V.D.1.
313
See discussion supra Sections V.C.3, V.D.2.
314
E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); W ASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(d)
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(2009) (“A person is criminal negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be
aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such
substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
exercise in the same situation.”); See discussion supra Section V.C.3.
315
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See discussion supra Section VI.A.
See discussion supra Section V.D.2.
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attorneys for some of the hearings that they are currently required to attend
317

in person.”

The Washington Supreme Court is considering these changes

and are accepting comments until September 30, 2020.318 There are still
many structural barriers between justice-involved individuals and accessing
the courts, and Washington courts should continue to explore changes to
319

court rules and cost-effective reminder systems.
E.S.H.B. 2231 is an important reform for justice-involved individuals
across Washington State—especially for low-income individuals,
individuals with mental health or addiction disorders, and people of color.
This bill happened in large part due to the work and research of this article,
WDA working groups on decriminalizing FTA, and the many public
defenders who advocated for their clients and shared their stories. There is
hope that E.S.H.B. 2231 is just the first step towards a more just court
system. The work continues.

317
See WASH. COURTS, Suggested Changes to CrR 3.4 and CrRLJ 3.4 (last visited Apr. 18, 2020),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.proposedRuleDisplay
&ruleId=4753
[https://perma.cc/7ZMG-9JSU].
318

319

Id.
See discussion supra Sections VI.B, VI.C.

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020

491

492 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

